Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
2-5-2020

PIEDMONT/MAPLE ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ PETITION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES
John J. Goger

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law
Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Fulton County Superior Court

*““EFILED***QW

Date: 2/5/2020 4:59 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
PIEDMONT/MAPLE, LLC, KAUFMAN
DEVELOPMENTPARTNERS, LP, and
CRAIG S. KAUFMAN,

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
2019CV327331

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants,

2014CV253094

v.
Bus. Case Div. 4

DAVID EICHENBLATT,
Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ PETITION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES UNDERO.C.G.A.§ 9-11-68 AND
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISBURSE FUNDS FROM REGISTRY
The above-styled matter is before the Court on: (1) Plaintiffs/Counterclaim-Defendants’!
Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses Under O.C.G.A § 9-11-68 (the “Petition”);
and (2) Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff David Eichenblatt’s Motion to Disburse Funds from
Registry (“Motion to Disburse Funds”). On January 15, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the
pending motions. Having considered the entire record and argumentof counsel,” the Court finds
as follows:
'
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim-Defendants include Piedmont/Maple, LLC (“Piedmont/Maple”), Kaufman
Development Partners, LP (“KDP”) and Craig S. Kaufman (“Kaufman”). For ease of reference, Piedmont/Maple,
KDP, and Kaufman will be referred to collectively herein as “Plaintiffs” (although only KDP and Kaufman are
Counterclaim-Defendants with respect to the counterclaims at issue in this case) and Defendant/CounterclaimPlaintiff David Eichenblatt will be referred to as “Eichenblatt.”
Because the original case (Case No. 2014-CV-253094) has been closed for more than 30 days andat the
direction of the Clerk of Court, Plaintiffs filed the Petition under a new case number, Case No. 2019-CV-327331. At
the parties’ request and to avoid confusion, the Court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order Regarding Plaintiffs’ Petition
for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-68, therein directing the Clerk of Court “to
file a copy of the Petition in Case No. 2014-CV-253094 as if it had been filed in that case originally, and
administratively relate or consolidate the two cases.” Thus, in ruling on the pending motions, the Court deems the
cases to have beenconsolidated andhas considered the entire record under both case numbers.
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I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation was initiated on October 27, 2014 as a declaratory judgment action to
establish the correct distribution amount owed to Eichenblatt following the winding down of
Piedmont/Maple (the “Declaratory Action”)? OnJanuary 9, 2015, Eichenblatt filed his Answer
and Counterclaim asserting two counterclaims against KDP and Kaufman sounding in breach of
contract and breachof fiduciary duty based on (1) the alleged underpaymentofrent by Plaintiffs’
affiliate, (2) the sale of two parcels as separate properties rather than as one “assemblage”, and
(3) the alleged manipulation of a 2012 loan.* On October 31, 2016, the Court issued an order on
several pending motions (“October 31, 2016 Order’) and therein granted Plaintiffs partial
summary judgment withrespect to certain counterclaims. That ruling was ultimately reversed on
appeal (“First Appeal”)° and the case proceeded to a jury trial in May 2018 on all then pending
claimsas discussed infra.
On November 18, 2016 (shortly after the October 31, 2016 Order but before the First

Appeal wasresolved), Plaintiffs made an offer of settlement pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (the
“Offer of Settlement”).° Plaintiffs’ Offer of Settlement stated in part:
[Plaintiffs] shall pay to Mr. Eichenblatt the aggregate sum of
[$125,000.00] (the “Settlement Payment”), in exchange for Mr.
Eichenblatt dismissing, with prejudice, all counterclaims asserted by Mr.
Eichenblatt against [Plaintiffs] in the above-referenced lawsuit. No

amount of this offer (Zero Dollars [$0]) is proposed to settle any claim
and/or counterclaim for punitive damages. To the extent that Mr.

Eichenblatt seeks to recover attorney’s fees and other expenses, the

Settlement Payment includes any and all such attorneys’ fees and other
expenses. The Settlement Payment shall settle and terminate any andall
counterclaims asserted by Mr. Eichenblatt in the above-referenced matter.’

8

’

See note 2, supra.
Answer, pp. 8-19.
See generally Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 761, 801 S.E.2d 616 (2017).
Petition, Ex. A (Offer of Settlement Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68), p. 2 at {I.

Id.

Plaintiffs’ counsel and Eichenblatt (who atthe time wasrepresenting himself pro se but
who during this period was communicating with current counsel) discussed the Offer of
Settlement verbally and via email.® Ultimately, the Offer of Settlement was not accepted within
thirty days and instead, on December 21, 2016, Eichenblatt sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a “Counter

Offer [sic] of Settlement Pursuant to O.C.G.A. [sic] 9-11-68”

(the

“Counteroffer”).’ The

Counteroffer was not accepted and, following the First Appeal and the remandto this Court, a
jury trial was held on May 7-10, 2018.
Shortly before the jury trial, and “[i]n order to narrow the issues to be considered by the
jury” Plaintiffs confessed judgment with respect to and agreed to pay $79,065.60 in full
satisfaction of Eichenblatt’s breach of contract counterclaim arising out of the underpayment of
rent.'° During thetrial, the Court granted partial directed verdict to Plaintiffs on Eichenblatt’s
breach of contract and breachoffiduciary duty counterclaims premised onthe sale of Piedmont
Court as two separate parcels rather than as one assemblage. As to the remaining claims, the
“Sury found that Piedmont/Maple had proved thatit correctly valuedits assets and distributions
to Eichenblatt regarding its attempted dissolution. The jury ruled against Eichenblatt on his
[other] counterclaims, finding that he failed to prove that Kaufman or KDP breached any
contracts ortheir fiduciary duties.”"'
On May 18, 2018, the Court entered a “Final Judgment” and a separate “Judgment”
specifically regarding the confession of judgment by Plaintiff KDP on the breach of contract

:
Defendant Eichenblatt’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation
Expenses Under O.C.G.A. §9-11-68 (“Def’s Response”), Ex. 5 (email thread dated December 13-14, 2016), Ex. 6
(email thread dated December 14-15, 2016), Ex. 7 (email thread dated December20-21, 2016).
See generally Petition, Ex. B (December 21, 2016 Email and Counteroffer of Settlement Pursuant to

O.C.G.A. 9-11-68 [sic]).
te
ut

Final Judgment (May 18, 2018), p. 1.
Eichenblatt vy. Piedmont/Maple, LLC et al., No. A19A0010, slip op. at p. 5 (Ga. Ct. App. June 24, 2019).
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counterclaim related to the underpayment of rent (hereinafter “Confession of Judgment”)
(collectively the “Final Orders”). The Confession of Judgmentstates:
Plaintiff Kaufman Development Partners, LP has confessed judgment in
the amount of $79,065.60 in full satisfaction of Defendant David L.

Eichenblatt’s counterclaim based on alleged underpayment of rent.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered against Plaintiff Kaufman

DevelopmentPartners, LP and in favor of Defendant David L. Eichenblatt

in the amount of $79,065.60. The rent claim having been paid in full,
Defendant’s counterclaim based on the alleged underpayment ofrent is
rendered moot.’
On May18, 2018—-several hours before the Final Orders were issued by this Court but
still on the same date as the Final Orders—Eichenblatt had filed Defendant’s Motion for
Prejudgment Interest Damages Arising out of Rent Underpayment (“Motion for Interest”).
Therein Eichenblatt asked this Court to award him prejudgmentinterest under O.C.G.A. § 13-613 on the rent underpayment claim to which Plaintiffs had confessed judgment. However, six
days later on May 24, 2018, Eichenblatt filed a Notice of Appeal from the Final Judgment
entered on May 18, 2018.
Thereafter a dispute arose regarding funds to be deposited into the Court’s Registry. On
June 12, 2018, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part Motion to Deposit FundsInto Registry
of Court, therein directing that ‘Plaintiffs may deposit $79,065.60 into the registry of the Court
and Eichenblatt may deposit $22,141.12 into the registry of the Court...”'? On or about July 16,
2018, Plaintiffs deposited $79,065.60 into the Court’s Registry——the fundsat issue in the instant
Motionto Disburse Funds."
2

=
Confession of Judgment (May 18, 2018), p. 1.
B
Order Granting in Part Motion to Deposit Funds Into Registry of Court (June 12, 2018), p. 1. As noted in
the order, the $79,065.60 sum was the amount paid per the Confession of Judgment in “full satisfaction” of
Eichenblatt’s claim for underpaymentof rent, and the $22,141.12 sum was for the “replacement funds” wired to
Eichenblatt to replace the final distribution check that Piedmont/Maple, LLC had previously issued to Eichenblatt
(representing his 40% distribution underthe terms of the Operating Agreement) which had not been cashed and had
gonestale duringthis litigation (“ReplacementDistribution Funds”).
i
It appears that Eichenblatt ultimately did not deposit any funds into the Court’s Registry.
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On June 24, 2019, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the Final Judgment
(“Second Appeal”). Eichenblatt now asks the Court to disburse to him the funds held in the
Court’s registry related to the Confession of Judgment on his breach of contract counterclaim for
the underpayment ofrent. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and have petitioned the Court for an
awardattorneys*fe s expenses9-11-68.

I.

PLAINTIFFS’ PETITION
A. Governing Law UnderO.C.G.A.§ 9-11-68
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 governs written offers to settle tort claims. It provides in pertinent

part:
(a)... Any offer underthis Code section must:
(1) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this Code
section;
(2) Identify the party or parties making the proposal and the party or
parties to whomthe proposalis being made;
(3) Identify generally the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to
resolve;

(4) State with particularity any relevant conditions;
(5) State the total amount ofthe proposal;
(6) State with particularity the amount proposedto settle a claim for
punitive damages, if any;
(7) State whether the proposal includes attorney's fees or other
expenses and whetherattorney's fees or other expensesare part of the
legal claim; and
(8) Include a certificate of service and be served by certified mail or
statutory overnight delivery in the form required by Code Section 911-5.

(b)(1) If a defendant makes anoffer of settlement whichis rejected by the
plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and expensesoflitigation incurred by the defendant...from the date
of the rejection of the offer of settlement through the entry of judgment
if...the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less than 75 percent of
such offerof settlement...
(c) Any offer made underthis Code sectionshall remain open for 30 days
unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the offeree prior to
acceptanceby the offeree, but an offeror shall not be entitled to attorney's
fees and costs under subsection (b) of this Code section to the extent an
5

offer is not open for at least 30 days (unlessit is rejected during that 30
day period). A counteroffer shall be deemed a rejection but mayserve as

an offer under this Code section if it is specifically denominated as an
offer under this Code section...

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (a)-(c). “[T]he ‘clear purpose’ ofthe statute is to encouragelitigants in tort
cases to make and accept goodfaith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation,
thereby advancingthis State's strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements.”
Georgia Dep't of Corr. v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 471, 759 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2014) (citing Smithv.
Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 29, 694 S.E.2d 83, 88 (2010)) (internal punctuation omitted).
B. Analysis, Findings, and Conclusions of Law

Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to an award of their attorneys’ fees andlitigation
expenses under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(1) because in the Final Judgment Eichenblatt recovered
less than 75% of Plaintiffs’ $125,000.00 settlement offer as set forth in the Offer of Settlement,
i.e. Eichenblatt recovered less than $93,750.00 on his counterclaims. Plaintiffs request an award

of $837,444.95 which they assert is the amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses reasonably
incurred between December 21, 2016, when Eichenblatt rejected their Offer of Settlement by
submitting his Counteroffer, and May 18, 2018, whenthe Final Orders were entered.!°
However, Eichenblatt contends he recovered more than 75% of the Offer of Settlement.

Specifically, he asserts that, in addition to the $79,065.60 confessed judgment for the
underpayment of rent claim, two additional amounts should be included when considering
Eichenblatt’s total recovery for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68: (1) the amount of prejudgment
interest at the legal rate of 7% on the confessed judgment of $79,065.60; and (2) the amount of

the final distribution paid to Eichenblatt after thetrial.'° In the alternative, Eichenblatt urges the

Petition, p. 4.
Def’s Response, p. 2.

requested attorneys’ fees and expenses should be disallowed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-1168(d)(2) because Plaintiffs’ Offer of Settlement was not madein good faith.'7
i.

Prejudgment Interest

Eichenblatt asserts he is entitled, as a matter of law, to an award ofprejudgmentinterest

judgment, with the total amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded being $31,035.43.'%
Eichenblatt further contends this prejudgment interest amount must be included in his total
recovery for purposes of determining whether he recovered at least 75 percent of the Offer of
Settlement.” The Court disagrees.
First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to now award prejudgment interest. Although
Eichenblatt filed his Motion for Interest on May 18, 2018 at 10:27 AM, the Court issued the
Final Orders that same day at 6:45 PM. The Final Orders do not include an award of
prejudgment interest. To the contrary, the Confession of Judgment states “the confessed
judgment in the amount of $79,065.60 [is] in full satisfaction of Defendant David L.

Eichenblatt’s counterclaim based on alleged underpayment of rent” and further declares that
“[t]he rent claim having been paid in full, Defendant’s counterclaim based on the alleged
underpaymentof rentis rendered moot.””” Similarly, the Final Judgmentstates “Kaufman agreed
to pay $79,065.60 in full satisfaction of the amount of Eichenblatt’s claim for underpayment of
rent.””'Thus, the Final Orders necessarily (though implicitly) denied Eichenblatt’s Motion for
Interest.

Def’s Response, p. 2.
Def’s Response,p. 3.
Def’s Response, p. 3.
Confession of Judgment (May 18, 2018), p. 1 (emphasis added).
Final Judgment (May 18, 2018), p. | (emphasis added).
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Eichenblatt did not move for reconsiderationor file a motionto set aside or to amend the
Final Orders, nor did he elicit an express ruling on the Motion for Interest at a time whenthe
Court could have amended the Final Orders. Instead, Eichenblatt divested the Court of
jurisdiction to amend the Final Orders by filing a Notice of Appeal of the Final Judgment on
June 24, 2018, only six daysafter the Final Orders were entered.

Georgia law is clear that the filing of the notice of appeal operates as a
supersedeas and deprives the trial court of the power to affect the
judgment appealed, so that subsequent proceedings purporting to
supplement, amend, alter or modify the judgment, whether pursuant to
statutory or inherent power, are withouteffect.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Doe, 292 Ga. App. 532, 539, 664 S.E.2d 893, 899
(2008). See, e.g., id. (finding trial court that entered judgment in favor of plaintiff lacked
authority to amend the judgment so as to award prejudgmentinterest after defendantfiled its
notice of appeal); Hutcheson Med. Ctr. v. Scealf, 205 Ga. App. 204, 205, 422 S.E.2d 20, 21
(1992) (holding that uponthe filing of a notice of appeal, the trial court lost all jurisdiction to
rule on a motion for reconsideration ofits order granting a dismissal with prejudice, noting that
upon filing a notice of appeal “the only process to enable [plaintiffs] to obtain a decision
changing the dismissal with prejudice to one without prejudice was through an appeal”). Thus,
whenEichenblatt filed his Notice of Appeal of the Final Judgment, the Court lostjurisdiction to

expressly rule on his Motionfor Interest. Thereafter Eichenblatt’s avenue to seek redress on the
denial of his request for prejudgment interest was through his appeal.
However, on appeal Eichenblatt did not raise the issue as an enumerationoferror. See
O.C.G.A. §5-6-40 (“The appellant and cross appellant shall file with the clerk of the appellate
court, at such time as may beprescribed byits rules, an enumerationof the errors which shall set
out separately each error relied upon’’); Odum vy. State, 255 Ga. App. 70, 71, 564 S.E.2d 490, 492

(2002) (“Matters not enumerated as error will not be considered on appeal”) (quoting Rider_y.
State, 226 Ga. 14, 14(2), 172 S.E.2d 318 (1970)). Also, Eichenblatt did not appeal or otherwise
challenge the Confession of Judgment which, as noted above, specifically addressed the
underpayment of rent claim and expressly stated the confessed judgment was in “full
satisfaction” of that claim, rendering the claim

“moot. °2-S06 Haywood v. Wooden Peg, Inc., 174

Ga. App. 806, 807, 331 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1985) (“Where [an] objection argued below is not
argued on appeal, it must be considered abandoned”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Courthasheldthat:
{w]hen a final judgment ofthetrial court is affirmed...and not remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings, the controversy is at an end; the
rights of the parties, so far as they are involved in the litigation, are
conclusively adjudicated. Further proceedings on the case in this court and
in the trial court are precluded and the judgment of the lowercourt is in
full force and effect, precisely the same as if no appealto this court had
beentaken.
Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga.
856, 858, 136 S.E.2d 371, 372-73 (1964).

Here, the Court’s judgment was affirmed in the

Second Appeal such that the parties’ rights have now been “conclusively adjudicated.” Id.
Eichenblatt having failed to seek appellate review of the issue of prejudgment interest on the
underpaymentof rent claim and the Court of Appeals having rendering its decision affirming the
Final Judgmentin toto, Eichenblatt has forever waived the issue of prejudgmentinterest and the
Court is precluded from now amendingoraltering the Final Judgmentas a matter of law.”?

22

ee
Confession of Judgment (May 18, 2018) (emphasis added).
oS
At the January 15, 2020 hearing, Eichenblatt argued that, given the close timing betweenthefiling of his
Motion for Interest and entry of the Final Orders, the Motionfor Interest should be converted to a Motion for
Reconsideration. However, Eichenblatt has not cited any authority to support this request. Further, insofar as the
Motion for Interest was filed before the Final Orders (which undisputedly included a Final Judgment that would
have had to expressly include prejudgment interest if such was to be awarded in this case), converting the Motion
for Interest to a motion seeking reconsideration would be an improper attempt to rewrite history. Eichenblatt’s
argument that the Final Judgment wasnot truly “final” since it did not direct how funds in the Court’s registry
would be handledis equally unavailing. First, the Final Orders were entered on May 18, 2018, well before Plaintiffs
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Further, even if not procedurally barred, Eichenblatt is not entitled to prejudgment
interest because he abandoned the claim attrial. Eichenblatt did not seek interest, prejudgment or
otherwise, in his initial counterclaim nor in any of the amendments thereto. In the Pre-Trial
Order, Eichenblatt requested “legal interest” under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-3, whichas Plaintiffs note is

cases where an amount ascertained would be the damagesat the time of the breach, it may be
increasedby the addition of legal interest from that time until the recovery.” (Emphasis added).
Importantly, whether to award prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13 is at the
discretion of the trier of fact. See, e.g., Pulte Home Corp. v. Woodland Nursery & Landscapes
Inc., 230 Ga. App. 455, 457, 496 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1998) (‘Allowanceof interest in actions for
unliquidated damagesarising from breach of contract is governed by O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13...The
jury in their discretion may increase the immediate amount of damages found, by an allowance

of interest”); Smith v. Maples, 114 Ga. App. 529, 529, 151 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1966) (“Underthis
code sectionit is error for the trial judge in a case involving unliquidated damagesto instruct the
jury that the plaintiff is entitled to interest...as in such a case the allowance ofinterest is a matter
withinthe jury's discretion’) (discussing Code 1933, § 20-1408, predecessor to O.C.G.A. § 13-613; citations omitted). Compare SurgiJet, Inc. v. Hicks, 236 Ga. App. 80, 82, 511 S.E.2d 194,

195-96 (1999) (“An award of pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13 was within the

moved to deposit funds into the Court’s registry on May 29, 2018 and before the Court entered on order regarding
same on June 12, 2018. Thus, the Final Orders could not address an issue that had not yet be presented.
Additionally, the issue of tendering funds into and disbursing out of the Court’s registry does not address the
substantive merits of the case and, thus, does not affect the finality of the Court’s Final Judgment. See Patterson v.

Bristol Timber Co., 286 Ga. App. 423, 425, 649 S.E.2d 795, 798 (2007) (“Under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), a trial

court's order constitutes a final judgment ‘where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court's
final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recoursein thetrial court”) (emphasis
added). Finally, the Court notes that funds deposited with leave of Court into its registry are “subject to withdrawal,
in whole or in part, at anytime thereafter uponorder of the court...” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 (emphasis added).
a
Pre-Trial Order (January 31, 2018), p. 19, Section C, Subsection 11(b). Eichenblatt’s Motion for Interest,
also requests an award of prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A.§ 13-6-13. See Defendant’s Motionfor Interest, p. 1.
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discretion of the trial judge as the trier of fact in this benchtrial”) (citation and internal
punctuation omitted); CRS Sirrine, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 213 Ga. App. 710, 719, 445 S.E.2d 782,

790 (1994) (“Since the damages sought in this case were unliquidated..., any pre-judgment
interest awardable was governed by O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13...Thus, the award of pre-judgment

omitted). See also PDA,Inc. v. Haas Corp., 185 Ga. App. 785, 786, 366 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1988)

(“[I]t is apparent that the [amount] awarded wasnota liquidated amount, and thus prejudgment
interest would be awardable only at the discretion ofthe factfinder”).
Here, Eichenblatt did not present the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury. No
evidence or argument on prejudgmentinterest was submittedto the jury during the trial nor was
there a jury instruction on prejudgmentinterest. Moreoverit was not included on the Special
Verdict Form, and the jury’s verdict cannot nowbe substantively amended to add prejudgment
interest. See O.C.G.A. §9-12-7 (“A verdict may be amended in mere matter of form afterthe jury
has dispersed. However, after a verdict has been received and recorded and the jury has
dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance either by what the jurors say they
intended to find or otherwise”); O.C.G.A. § 9-12-9 (“Judgment and execution shall conform to
the verdict”); Aston Mills, Inc. v. Suntek Indus., Inc., 190 Ga. App. 217, 218, 378 S.E.2d 399,

400 (1989)(“It was necessary that the jury expressly find interest, and, by their verdict, specify
as a separate sum the interest found to be due ontheprincipal sum in orderthat the plaintiff be
entitled to recoverinterest...[T]he trial judge was withoutauthority to add [prejudgment] interest
to that judgment without a direction to do so in the verdict...The entry of an interest judgment
here was an impermissible variation of the jury's verdict’) (collecting cases). Insofar as

Eichenblatt did not present the issue to the finder of fact—here, the jury—prejudgmentinterest
cannot be awarded under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13.

Eichenblatt also cannot recover prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. §7-4-15, as that
code sectiononly applies to liquidated damages where a demand has been madefora liquidated
amount. Specificatty,O.C.G-A. § 7=4-15 provides:
All liquidated demands, where by agreement or otherwise the sum to be
paid is fixed or certain, bear interest fromthe time the party shall become
liable and bound to pay them; if payable on demand, they shall bear
interest from the time of the demand. In case of promissory notes payable
on demand, the law presumes a demandinstantly and gives interest from
date.
O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 (emphasis added). “Underthis statute, prejudgment interest — which flows
automatically from a liquidated demand — is to be awarded upon a judgmentfor a liquidated
amount. Thus, as long as there is a demand for prejudgment interest prior to the entry offinal
judgment, a trial court should award it.” Georgia Lottery Corp. v. Vasaya, No. A19A1625, 2019
WL 5616681, at *5 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2019) (citing to Crisler v. Haugabook, 290 Ga. 863,

864, 725 S.E.2d 318 (2012)). “The only requirement for a prejudgment interest award upon a
liquidated damagesclaim is a demand.” Id.
Here, Eichenblatt did not make a demandfor a liquidated amount. During oral argument,
Eichenblatt’s counsel argued that because the amount of Eichenblatt’s damages flowing from the

rent claim was capable of being ascertained it should be considered a liquidated demand.
However,

[a] liquidated claim is for an amount certain and fixed. Conversely, a
claim is unliquidated whenthere is a bonafide contentionas to the amount
owing. Ryanv. Progressive Retailer Pub. Co., 16 Ga. App. 83 (84 SE 834)
(1915).”International Indem. Co. v. Terrell, 178 Ga.App. [570,] 570(2),
344 S.E.2d 239 [(1986)]. A liquidated claim is “an amount certain and
Jixed, either by the act and agreementofthe parties or by operation of law;
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a sum which cannot be changed bythe proof; it is so muchornothing;...”
Nisbet v. Lawson, | Ga. 275, 287 [(1846)].
Home Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co.,

192 Ga. App. 551, 557, 385 S.E.2d 736, 741 (1989)

(emphasis in original). See also In re Estate of Miraglia, 290 Ga. App. 28, 31, 658 S.E.2d 777,

780 (2008) (“The word ‘liquidated’ as used in O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 means‘settled, acknowledged,
or agreed’”) (quoting Holloway v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 245 Ga. App. 319, 321, 537
S.E.2d 121, 124 (2000)).
Eichenblatt never made a “liquidated demand” for $79,065.60. Further, the amount of

rent claim was not “settled, acknowledged, or agreed.” For example, in his counterclaim
Eichenblatt asserted the tenant, Plaintiffs’ affiliate Kaufman Realty Group,Inc., should have paid
rent “from January 1, 2010 through late 2013 in the amount of approximately $422,451” and that
he was “harmed to the extent of 40% of the unpaid rent.’*> However, in pre-trial briefings
Eichenblatt acknowledged the timeframe for the claim was narrower and agreed he would not
seek “damages for underpayment of rent occurring before September 2011 or after November
2013.’”° Inruling on pretrial motions the Court found that Eichenblatt’s claims based on any rent

underpaymentsthat predated a September 2011 trial in priorlitigation between these parties were
barred by res judicata because they were or could have been put at issue during thefirst trial.?”
The Pre-Trial Order further demonstrates the numerous bona fide disputes regarding rent
payments”and,thus, the unliquidated nature of Eichenblatt’s rent claims.

2

Answer, p. 15 at {§ 51-52.

26
Brief in Opposition [sic] Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude
Time-Barred Evidence of Alleged Rent Underpayments and Evidence of Alleged Rent Underpayments After
November2013, p. 2.
a
Order on Pending Motions (January 26, 2018), pp. 4-5.
a
Pre-Trial Order (January 31, 2018), pp. 6, 10-11, 15-16, 18, 20 (discussing the parties’ disputes with
respect to the rent underpaymentclaimincluding, e.g., the timeframeforcalculating the alleged rent underpayments,
whether the properrent was charged given the parties’ agreements and the leased space, whether the office space
was re-measured according to Building Owners and Managers Associations International (BOMA)standards, and
whetherthe reductionsin leased office space substantially complied with the parties’ Separation Agreement).
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Givenall of the above, Eichenblatt is not entitled to prejudgmentinterest on his breach of
contract counterclaim premised on the underpayment of rent and it follows that such amount
cannot be considered when assessing whether Plaintiffs are entitled to their fees and expenses
under O.C.G.A. §9-11-68.

ii. Finat Distribution Check
Eichenblatt contends that for the purpose of evaluating whether he has recovered at least
75% of the Offer of Settlement, the $22,141.12 distribution amount (i.e. the Replacement

Distribution Funds”) should be added to the amount of the confessed judgment on the rent
underpayment claim.

However, notwithstanding the discussions between the parties/their

counsel at the time the Offer of Settlement was pending, by its express terms the Offer of
Settlement was intended to settle only Eichenblatt’s “counterclaims.” See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(a)
(stating an offer of settlement must, inter alia, “[iJdentify generally the claim or claims the
proposal is attempting to resolve” and “[s]tate with particularity any relevant conditions”). The
Replacement Distribution Funds stem from Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim on which
Plaintiffs undisputedly prevailed rather than Eichenblatt’s counterclaims on which Eichenblatt
only recovered the confessed judgment amount of $79,065.60. Indeed, it appears undisputed the
distribution was made by Plaintiff Piedmont/Maple, an entity that Eichenblatt did not assert any
counterclaim against.
In the final analysis, to allow a defendant who forced a plaintiff to fully litigate a
declaratory judgment claim and wholost the claimat trial to then tack on the value of that claim
to a confessed judgment on his counterclaim for purposes of defending against liability under
O.C.G.A. §9-11-68 on a settlement offer directed on the counterclaims would completely
circumvent the purposes of that statute to “encouragelitigants in tort cases to make and accept
29

2

See note 13, supra.
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good faith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessarylitigation.” Couch, 295 Ga. at 471.
Having considered the entire record, the Court finds the Replacement Distribution Funds
($22,141.12) cannot be considered for purposesof assessing Plaintiffs’ Petition and, specifically,
whether“the [Final Judgment] obtained by [Eichenblatt] is less than 75 percentof [Plaintiffs’
Offerof Settlement].” O.C.G.A. § 9-T1-68(b)(1).

iii. Lack of Good Faith
Finally, and in the alternative, Eichenblatt argues Plaintiffs’ Offer of Settlement should
be disallowed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(d)(2) because it was not made in goodfaith. O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-68(d) provides:
(d)(1) The court shall order the payment of attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation upon receipt of proof that the judgment is one to which the
provisions ofeither paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this

Code section apply; provided, however, that if an appeal is taken from

such judgment, the court shall order payment of such attorney's fees and
expensesoflitigation only upon remittitur affirming such judgment.

(2) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisionsof this
Code section, the court may determine that an offer was not made in
good faith in an ordersetting forth the basis for such a determination. In
such case, the court may disallow an awardof attorney's fees and costs.
(Emphasis). Thus, an offeror is generally entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and expenses
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 if the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) apply unless the Court
expressly finds the offer was not made in goodfaith. See also O.C.G.A. §9-11-68(b)(1) (“...the
defendantshall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expensesoflitigation. ..”);
Lewis v. State, 283 Ga. 191, 194, 657 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2008) (“[Flor the purposesof statutory

construction, the word “shall” is to be generally construed as a mandatory directive”) (citing
State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510, 436 S.E.2d 209 (1993)).
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Whether anoffer to settle a tort claim was made in goodfaith is a factual determination
to be made bythe trial court. As explained by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Great W. Cas.
Co. v. Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. 180, 721 S.E.2d 173 (2011):
[T]he trial court determines the reasonableness ofa[] [party’s] offer to
settle. It is a factual determination, based onthetrial court's assessment of
the case, the parties, the lawyers, and all of the other factors that go into

such a determination, which the trial court has gathered during the
progress of the case. In explaining that appellate courts defer to trial
courts’ rulings on the admissibility of evidence, our Supreme Court has
stated, “This is so becausetrial courts, unlike appellate courts, are familiar
with a piece of litigation from its inception, hearfirst-hand the arguments
of counsel, and consider disputed evidence within the contextof an entire
proceeding.” Cooper Tire, etc., Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 456-457(2),

543 S.E.2d 21 (2001). Further, “[o]n appeal, this court must not substitute
its judgment for that exercised by the trial court when there is some
support forthe trial court's conclusion.” Jennings Enterprises v. Carte, 224

Ga. App. 538, 541(5), 481 S.E.2d 541 (1997) (affirming trial court's

decision not to award attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11). Similarly,
a trial court's consideration of an offer of settlement is made within the
context of an entire proceeding.

Great W. Cas. Co., 313 Ga. App. at 183. In particular, the trial court should consider whetherthe
offeror had a reasonable foundation on whichto basethe settlement offer:
[W]hether the offeror has good faith rests on whether the offeror has a
reasonable foundation on whichto base the offer. So long as the offeror has a
basis in known or reasonably believed fact to conclude that the offeris
justifiable, the good faith requirement has beensatisfied. In the context of a
nominal offer of judgment, this court has held that where the offeror has a
reasonable basis to believe that exposure to liability is minimal, a nominal
offer is appropriate. Whetherthe offeror has a reasonable basis to support the
offer is determined solely by the subjective motivations and beliefs of the
offeror. In making this determination, the trial court is not restricted to the
testimony of the offeror attesting to good faith; rather, the court may properly
consider objective evidence of facts and circumstances that suggest whether
the offeror made the offer with subjective goodfaith...
Several types of objective evidence have been found relevant to a finding of
good faith,...including (1) whether the offer bore no reasonable relationship to
the amount of damagesor (2) a realistic assessmentofliability, or (3) that [the
offeror] lacked intent to settle the claim...Other examples of objective
evidence include whether the offer was made prematurely based upon the
16

amount of discovery completed,...the plaintiff's medical records, independent
medical examinationreports, and the amount of property damage...
While...courts may consider objective evidence, they cannot base a ruling
exclusively on the objective factors...Instead, they are required to consider
[the offeror’s] explanation and then determine whether, despite consideration
of the objective factors...[the offeror] had a subjectively reasonable belief on
whichto base its offer...The fact that [an] offer was nominal in amountis not
necessarily determinative of the issue of goodfaith.
Richardson _v. Locklyn, 339 Ga. App. 457, 460, 793 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2016) (adopting the
analysis of Florida courts when construing Florida’s offer ofjudgmentstatue, Fla. Stat. § 768.79,
upon which O.C.G.A. §9-11-68 is modeled)(citations and punctuation omitted). See also Coastal
Bank v. Rawlins, 347 Ga. App. 847, 850, 821 S.E.2d 89, 92 (2018) (noting that in Richardson,
supra, the Court of Appeals of Georgia “adopted Florida’s test for determining whetheran offer
of settlement was made in good faith”). Notably, “[t]he offeree (aggrieved party) has the burden
to show the absence of good faith.” Hillman v. Bord, 347 Ga. App. 651, 655, 820 S.E.2d 482,

487 (2018).
Here, Eichenblatt points out that when the rent claim judgment, $79,065.60, and the

distribution payment of $22,141.12 are subtracted from the Offer of Settlement amount,
$125,000, the remaining amount is disproportionate to “Eichenblatt’s remaining multi-million
dollar claims.”*” Eichenblatt, thus, asks this Court to conclude that that remaining amount bore

no reasonable relationship to the claimed damages such that the offer was not made in good
faith. Plaintiffs urge their Offer of Settlement was based ona realistic assessment ofliability and
was grounded in consideration of the circumstances that existed when they presented it,
including the fact that this Court had entered summary judgment against Eichenblatt on several
of his counterclaimswith the only remaining claims premised on the underpaymentofrent.*!

2

Def’s Response, p. 19.
Reply in Supportof Plaintiffs’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses, pp. 12-13.
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Having carefully considered the expansive record of this case which spans morethanfive
years oflitigation (not counting previouslitigation between these parties), the Court is satisfied
that Plaintiffs had a “reasonable foundation on which to base the[ir] offer” and on which “to
conclude that the offer [wa]s justifiable.” Richardson, 339 Ga. App. at 460. Eichenblatt, in turn,

The Offer of Settlement for $125,000.00 can hardly be characterized as “nominal” but evenif it

were,Plaintiffs had “a reasonable basis to believe that exposureto liability [would be] minimal”
(id.) given the procedural posture of the case, the then-remaining claims, and the considerable
discovery that had been conducted atthe time the Offer of Settlement was made.
C. CONCLUSION

Having considered the entire record and given all of the above, Plaintiffs’ Petition is
hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiffs requested “reasonable attorneys’ fees and expensesoflitigation in the amount
of $837,444.95 from December 21, 2016 through May 18, 2018.”** This figure is supported by
the Affidavit of Eric Jon Taylor and the invoices attached thereto.** It appears that time entries
39 66.
related to, e.g., “inefficiencies”,
“time devoted to training young lawyers, 90

cee

getting up to speed

time’ if new lawyers [were] assigned to the case,” and preparing the Affidavit and Petition were
excluded.** Further, as averred by Taylor, the time devoted to the case was “necessary and
appropriate,” the hourly rates are reasonable, and the costs incurred were reasonable and
necessary given the nature of the litigation.®® Notably, Eichenblatt has not challenged the
reasonablenessor necessity of the fees and costs sought.

32
3

M

=

Petition, p. 4.
See generallyPetition. Ex. E (Aff. of Eric Jon Taylor) and Ex. | attached thereto.
Petition. Ex. E (Aff. of Eric Jon Taylor) at {14.

Petition. Ex. E (Aff. of Eric Jon Taylor)at 913.
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Having granted Plaintiffs’ Petition and given the foregoing, the Court hereby awards to
Plaintiffs and ORDERS judgment against Eichenblatt on Plaintiffs’ Petition in the total amount

of $837,444.95.
If,

EICHENBLATT’S MOTION TO DISBURSE FUNDS
As noted above, following receipt of the Remittitur affirming the Final Judgmentinthe

Second Appeal, Eichenblatt filed a Motion to Disburse Funds. Therein he asks the Courtto order
that the $79,065.60 tendered into the Court’s registry related to the Confession of Judgment,
together with any interest thereon, be disbursed to him. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Disburse
Fundsand ask that upon ruling on their Petition that the Court order the fundsin the registry and
any interest earned thereonbe disbursedto themto offset the amount owed by Eichenblatt.
Given the Court’s rulings above and the current posture of these cases and whereas no
authority has been presented to the Court precluding Plaintiffs’ requested relief, Eichenblatt’s
Motion to Disburse Funds is hereby DENIED. Instead, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to
disburse the funds tendered into the Court’s registry and any interest earned thereonto Plaintiffs
to offset the amount awarded in Part I(C), supra, on Plaintiffs’ Petition. Plaintiffs are
ORDEREDto promptly advise the Court the name and address to whom the check should be
madefor the disbursedfunds so that the Court mayenteranorderdirecting the Clerk of Clerk to
disburse the funds.

4

SO ORDERED,this_()_

day ofFebruary, 2020.

Vnae

Toney GOGER,‘i JUDGE
Superier Court of Fyfton County

Business Case Division

Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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